Generalized stochastic dominance and bad outcome aversion by Hans Peters et al.
Soc Choice Welf (2010) 35:285–290
DOI 10.1007/s00355-010-0441-1
ORIGINAL PAPER
Generalized stochastic dominance and bad
outcome aversion
Hans Peters · Tim Schulteis · Dries Vermeulen
Received: 27 January 2009 / Accepted: 12 January 2010 / Published online: 9 February 2010
© The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Incomplete preferences over lotteries on a finite set of alternatives satis-
fying, besides independence and continuity, a property called bad outcome aversion
are considered. These preferences are characterized in terms of their specific multi-
expected utility representations (cf. Dubra et al., J Econ Theory, 115:118–133, 2004),
and can be seen as generalized stochastic dominance preferences.
1 Introduction
A familiar and widely accepted way to order probability distributions on a set of
alternatives is to use (first or higher degree) stochastic dominance.1 A typical prop-
erty of such an incomplete ordering, or preference, is that a positive probability on a
bad alternative cannot be compensated by putting high probabilities on better alter-
natives. In this article, we study and characterize this typical property, which we call
bad outcome aversion (BOA). Specifically, we consider incomplete preferences over
lotteries on a finite set of alternatives and assume the classical conditions of (von
1 See Levy (1992) for an overview of theory and applications of stochastic dominance.
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Neumann and Morgenstern) independence and continuity, so that the ‘multi-expected
utility’ theorem of Dubra et al. (2004) applies. This result characterizes such prefer-
ences in terms of representing closed and convex sets of functions. Our main result
(Theorem 3.2) characterizes BOA in terms of specific elements contained in these
representing sets of functions. This characterization is very helpful in defining or
identifying preferences satisfying BOA.
Thus, we present a broad generalization of stochastic dominance preferences. In
Example 3.3, we apply our main result to a class of stochastic dominance preferences
derived from Fishburn (1976). An application to stochastic dominance preferences in
two-person non-cooperative games can be found in Perea et al. (2006), who extend a
result of Fishburn (1978).
This study can also be applied to measuring inequality. Alternatives correspond to
states of welfare, for instance, income, and lotteries to distributions of the population
over these states. Bad outcome aversion then implies that, for instance, an income
distribution  can never be better than another income distribution ′ if  has a higher
percentage of poorest people than ′, not even if under ′ all other people are richer
than under .
2 Preliminaries
Let X := {x1, . . . , xn}, where n ≥ 3, be a finite set of alternatives and let (X) denote
the set of probability distributions (lotteries) over X . We also use the letters x, y, . . .
to denote elements of X . A preference  is a reflexive and transitive binary relation
on (X). If (p, q) ∈ , then we say that p is (weakly) preferred over q. Instead of
(p, q) ∈ , we often use the notation p  q. We write p  q if p  q and q  p,
and p ∼ q if p  q and q  p. For p ∈ (X) and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, pi denotes the
probability that p assigns to xi , and p(x) the probability that p assigns to x ∈ X . The
degenerate lottery that assigns probability one to the alternative x ∈ X is identified
with x . Observe that we do not require completeness of .
The following possible conditions on  are well known.
Axiom 2.1 (Independence) For all p, q, r ∈ (X) and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
p  q ⇒ λp + (1 − λ) r  λq + (1 − λ) r.
Axiom 2.2 (Continuity) For all q ∈ (X), the sets {p ∈ (X)|p  q} and {p ∈
(X) | q  p} are closed in (X).
Let U ⊆ RX be a set of real-valued functions on X . For u ∈ RX and a lottery
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the expectation of p under u. We say that U represents the preference  if for all
p, q ∈ (X),
p  q ⇔ Eu(p) ≥ Eu(q) for all u ∈ U.
The following ‘multi-expected utility’ theorem follows from Dubra et al. (2004)
and generalizes the familiar von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theorem to
incomplete preferences.2
Theorem 2.3 Let  be a preference. Then  satisfies independence and continuity if
and only if there is a closed and convex set U ⊆ RX that represents .
3 Bad outcome aversion
First degree stochastic dominance is a well-known example of a preference to which
Theorem 2.3 applies. For any permutation π of {1, . . . , n}, the first degree stochastic
dominance preference π is defined by






qπ(i) for all j = 1, . . . , n
for all p, q ∈ (X). Note that π strictly orders all alternatives of X , specifically,
xπ(n) π . . . π xπ(1). Therefore, first degree stochastic dominance preferences are
complete on degenerate lotteries. Clearly, if qπ(1) < pπ(1), then p  q: thus if p puts
higher probability on the worst alternative than q, then this can never be compensated
by p putting higher probabilities on better alternatives. This property is typical for
a preference such as first degree stochastic dominance. In a more general form, it is
described by the following axiom.
Axiom 3.1 (Bad outcome aversion, BOA) For all p, q ∈ (X) and all x ∈ X , if
p(x) > q(x) and p(z) = q(z) for all z ∈ X with x  z, then p  q.
The interpretation of this axiom is as follows. Think of x as a ‘bad’ alternative, on
which p puts more weight than q and such that p and q put equal weights on all
alternatives worse than x . Then, the axiom says that this can never be compensated –
that is, p cannot be made to dominate q – by the weights put by p on alternatives that
are better or at least not worse than x .
In the framework of inequality measurement, the alternatives are social states, and
the probabilities are population shares. Bad outcome aversion then implies that if in
p the number of people in state x is higher than in q while these numbers are equal
for all worse states, then p can only be worse than q , never better. In other words, if
there are more people in a poor state, then this fact cannot be compensated by having
more people in some richer state. Thus, BOA has a typically Rawlsian flavor.
2 Dubra et al. (2004) formalize observations already present in Aumann (1962).
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Clearly, first degree stochastic dominance preferences satisfy BOA, but there are
many more. The purpose of this note is to characterize BOA for preferences that sat-
isfy independence and continuity and that strictly order all elements of X , by using
the multi-expected utility theorem, Theorem 2.3. More precisely, we show that such
a preference satisfies BOA if and only if the representing class of functions contains
specific elements.3
Theorem 3.2 Let the preference  satisfy independence and continuity, and suppose
xn  xn−1  . . .  x1. Let U ⊆ RX represent . Then,  satisfies BOA if and only if
for each i = 1, . . . , n − 1 there is a sequence (uk)k∈N, uk ∈ U and uk(xi ) < uk(xn)




uk(xn) − uk(xi ) = 0. (1)
The intuition for condition (1) is as follows. For every alternative xi that is not the
best alternative xn , we can make the ratio of the utility difference between xn and xi to
the utility difference between xn and the (one-step) better alternative xi+1, as large as
we want. This implies that this difference can never be ‘compensated’ by putting high
probability on xi+1 (or better alternatives) whenever xi receives positive probability.
This is, indeed, what BOA is intended to capture.
Proof of Theorem 3.2 We may normalize any u ∈ U such that u(x1) = 0 and
u(xn) = 1.
For the ‘if’ part, let p, q, x satisfy the conditions in the statement of BOA. Then,
x = xn , so x = xi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}. Let (uk)k∈N be a sequence with uk ∈ U
and uk(xi ) < uk(xn) for each k ∈ N such that (1) is satisfied. Without loss of gener-
ality, we may assume that the sequence (uk)k∈N converges. With α :=
∑i−1
j=1 q j =∑i−1
j=1 p j , we can write
lim
k→∞ Euk (q) ≥ limk→∞
i−1∑
j=1
q j uk(x j ) + qi uk(xi ) + (1 − qi − α)uk(xi+1)
and
lim
k→∞ Euk (p) ≤ limk→∞
i−1∑
j=1
p j uk(x j ) + pi uk(xi ) + (1 − pi − α).
We claim that for k sufficiently large, Euk (q) > Euk (p). In order to show this, since
p j = q j for 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1, it is sufficient to prove that
qi uk(xi ) + (1 − qi − α)uk(xi+1) > pi uk(xi ) + (1 − pi − α)
3 Typically also, lexicographic preferences on (X) satisfy BOA, but they are not continuous. It is not
hard to show that any preference which satisfies BOA and allows no indifference between the alternatives
in X , is a subset of a lexicographic preference.
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or, equivalently
(1 − qi − α)[1 − uk(xi+1)] < (pi − qi )[1 − uk(xi )]
for k sufficiently large. This, however, follows by (1). So p  q.
For the converse, assume that  satisfies BOA. Fix i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Fix 0 <
π < 1, consider the lottery p = πxi + (1 − π)xi+1, and for each 0 < ε < 1 − π
consider the lottery pε = (π + ε)xi + (1 − π − ε)xn . By BOA, pε  p, and, hence,
there is a uε ∈ U such that Euε (p) > Euε (pε), i.e.,
(1 − π)(1 − uε(xi+1)) < ε(1 − uε(xi )).
This implies the existence of a sequence (uk)k∈N with uk ∈ U and uk(xi ) < uk(xn)
for each k ∈ N such that (1) is satisfied. unionsq
A consequence of Theorem 3.2 is that, under the additional conditions in the the-
orem, BOA implies incompleteness of the preference. This is so because a complete
preference is represented by a unique 0–1 normalized function and, thus, a sequence
satisfying (1) cannot exist for every i .
In the following application of Theorem 3.2, we consider a special class of prefer-
ences.
Example 3.3 For each t ∈ R, t ≥ 1, we define the n × n-matrix At by (at)i j := 0
for all i, j with i > j and by (at)i j := − (t + j − i) / ( j − i)!(t) for all i, j with
i ≤ j .4 We define the preference t by
p t q ⇔ p At ≥ q At
for all p, q ∈ (X), where the inequality is coordinate-wise. It can be verified that
xn t . . . t x1, and thus t strictly orders the elements of X . Also, 1 is the first
degree stochastic dominance preference associated with this ordering of the elements
of X , i.e., 1 is equal to π for π equal to the identity. The preferences t were
introduced in Fishburn (1976) as a generalization of first and higher degree stochastic
dominance with the real line as set of alternatives. Here, we have adapted Fishburn’s
definition to our framework of finitely many alternatives. One can think of the alter-
natives as located on the real line with xi placed at point i . For instance, the preference
2 is then second-degree stochastic dominance. In general, the representing set U as
in Theorem 2.3 for t is the convex hull of the columns of At . In this case, one can
simply take uk in Theorem 3.2 constant and equal to the i-th column of At .
We conclude with an examination of the three alternative case.
Example 3.4 For the case of three alternatives the consequences of Theorem 3.2 are
as follows. Since we can assume that every u ∈ U has the form (0, α, 1), the theorem
applied for i = 1 implies (0, 1, 1) ∈ U . Let α∗ := inf{α | (0, α, 1) ∈ U }, then
4 Here, (x) = ∫ ∞0 sx−1e−sds is the gamma function. In particular, (t) = (t − 1)! for t ∈ N.
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convexity and closedness of U imply that U is the convex hull of (0, 1, 1) and
(0, α∗, 1). Consider, on the other hand, the 3 × 3-matrix At and normalize its col-










implying that the class of functions U t representing t is the convex hull of (0, 1, 1)
and (0, (t − 1)/t, 1) if t ≤ 2 and of (0, 1, 1) and (0, t/(t + 2), 1) if t ≥ 2. In
turn, this implies that  coincides with t , where t = 1/(1 − α∗) if α∗ ≤ 1/2 and
t = 2α∗/(1−α∗) if α∗ ≥ 1/2. Thus, for n = 3, if  satisfies independence, continuity,
BOA, and if x3  x2  x1, then  = t for some t ∈ R, t ≥ 1.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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